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I. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act/ 
specifically Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7(2) / provided tor excess 
personal injury protection benefits coverage to an insured who 
has received such benefits under a separate policy of automobile 
insurance/ as long as the insured does not receive duplication of 
benefits. 
2. If the answer to issue no. 1 is affirmative/ 
whether the exclusion contained in respondent Nationwidefs 
policy/ which states/ "We will not pay for bodily injury to 
anyone arising from any of the following: . . . e. Occupying or 
being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle other than your 
auto/ which is covered as required under the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act"/ is valid in view of the fact that the 
exclusion is not one of those permitted by Utah Code Ann. §31-
41-10. 
3. Assuming that U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2) does permit 
stacking such as that sought by plaintiff/ and assuming further 
that the above-quoted policy exclusion is not permitted by the 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Act/ additional issues exist as to 
whether the Insurance Commissioner's Regulation 73-1/ Article 5, 
1. All references to the Insurance Code/ except where 
otherwise indicated/ are to the code prior to its reinactment as 
Title 31A. The motor vehicle accident giving rise to appellant's 
claim occurred on January 25/ 1986. Title 31A was effective July 
1/ 1986. The subject matter formerly covered in Title 31, 
Chapter 41 is now covered at U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 through 309. 
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Subdivision i, conflicts with § 31-41-7(2) and is therefore in 
excess of the administrative authority granted him; and 
4. Whether/ under the facts of this case/ Nationwide's 
"Other Insurance" clause bars appellant from recovering benefits 
from her own insurer in view of the payment of personal injury 
protection medical benefits to her by the insurer of the vehicle 
which struck her while she was a pedestrian, or alternatively 
whether the "Other Insurance" clause conflicts with U.C.A. § 
31-41-10. 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts are undisputed and the parties filed 
a pleading entitled Stipulated Facts with the trial court (R. 56-
61). Briefly, appellant Vickie Crowther has incurred more than 
$7/000 in hospital and medical expenses (R. 37) as the result of 
injuries sustained when she was struck by an automobile while a 
pedestrian. The automobile which struck her was covered by a 
liability insurance policy which provided basic personal injury 
protection (PIP) benefits required under the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act. Mrs. Crowther has been paid the full $2,000 
in medical benefits provided by that coverage. Mrs. Crowther was 
also insured under a policy of automobile liability insurance 
issued by respondent Nationwide. Nationwide!s policy also 
included the minimum required PIP coverage, and under it Mrs. 
Crowther claimed an additional $2,000 in medical expenses. 
Nationwide refused to pay, contending that PIP coverage can not 
be "stacked" in that manner and further contending that Mrs. 
Crowtherfs claim was barred by a specific exclusion in the policy 
and by the policy's "other insurance" clause. 
Upon Nationwide's failure to pay benefits, Mrs. 
Crowther brought suit as authorized by U.C.A. § 31-41-8. 
Nationwide answered Mrs. Crowtherfs Complaint and, after 
stipulating to the relevant facts, both parties brought cross-
motions for summary judgment. In view of the stipulation as to 
the facts, both sides recognized that one of the motions would in 
all liklihood be granted and the other denied. The trial court 
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granted Nationwidefs summary judgment motion and denied Mrs. 
Crowther's summary judgment motion (R. 96-97). Mrs. Crowther 
then appealed to this Court (R. 98-99). 
The stipulated facts (R. 56-61) are as follows: 
1. Nationwide is an insurer doing business in the 
State of Utah and with an office and place of business in Salt 
Lake County/ Utah. 
2. On January 25/ 1986/ Vickie Crowther was the 
insured under a policy of automobile insurance issued by 
Nationwide. 
3. The automobile insurance policy issued by 
Nationwide included Endorsement 1594 providing for personal 
injury protection coverage. 
4. On January 25/ 1986/ Mrs. Crowther sustained 
accidental bodily injury while a pedestrian when struck by a 
motor vehicle/ other than her own/ which was covered as required 
under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
5. As a direct and proximate result of the accident 
described in the preceding paragraph/ Mrs. Crowther incurred 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in a sum in excess of 
$4/000.00. 
6. Mrs. Crowther was paid $2/000 in personal injury 
protection medical expense benefits by the insurer of the motor 
vehicle which struck her. 
7. Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) was the entire 
amount of personal injury protection medical expense benefits 
available under the policy describing the automobile which struck 
Mrs. Crowther. 
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8. Mrs. Crowther made demand upon Nationwide for 
payment of $2/000 medical expense benefits pursuant to the terms 
of the policy under which she was an insured. 
9. Nationwide failed within thirty-five (35) days 
after receipt of proof of Mrs. Crowtherfs medical expenses/ or at 
all/ to pay personal injury protection medical expense benefits 
under the policy issued by it. 
10. Mrs. Crowther does not claim to be entitled to 
more than $2/000 in benefits under the policy issued by 
Nationwide [but she does claim a right to interest and attorney 
fees pursuant to U.C.A. § 31-41-8]. 
A true and correct copy of the Stipulated Facts (R. 56) 
is included in the Addendum to this Opening Brief of Appellant. 
A true and correct copy of Nationwide's policyfs Endorsement 1594 
(R. 59-61) is attached to the Stipulated Facts. 
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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it granted respondent 
Nationwidefs summary judgment motion and denied appellant Vickie 
Crowther's summary judgment motion. Implicit in the trial 
court's ruling and Order (R. 96) is a finding that Mrs. Crowther 
was not entitled to collect personal injury protection medical 
expense benefits from her own insurance carrier after being paid 
$2/000 in PIP medical expense benefits by the insurer of the 
vehicle which struck her while she was a pedestrian. 
Utah's no-fault automobile insurance scheme/ as it 
existed on the date of the accident/ January 25/ 1986/ neither 
expressly permitted nor prohibited so-called "stacking" of 
benefits. However, Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7(2) stated: 
"When a person injured is also an insured party under 
any other policy/ including those complying with this act/ 
primary coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring 
the motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident 
arose." 
Use of the word "primary" in the statute infers the 
possible existance of "excess" coverage. Section 31-41-7(2) 
provided for priority of payment. 
The policy exclusion relied on by Nationwide is not one 
of those exclusions expressly permitted by the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act. The exclusion upon which Nationwide 
relied in refusing to make payment states: "We will not pay for 
bodily injury to anyone arising from any of the following: . . . 
e. Occupying or being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle 
other than your auto/ which is covered as required under the Utah 
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Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act." Admittedly/ that exclusion 
does address the factual situation in which Mrs, Crowther was 
involved. However, since Mrs. Crowther was a person covered by 
the Act (U.C.A. § 31-41-7(1)), she was entitled to coverage from 
her own insurer/ subject only to the permissable exclusions set 
forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., Utah, 
608 P.2d 242 (1980). 
Neither does Nationwidefs "other insurance" policy 
clause deprive Mrs. Crowther of coverage. For all practical 
purposes/ that clause is nothing more than another exclusion from 
the coverage required to be provided by the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act and is not one of the permissable exclusions 
set forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10. The reasonable interpretation of 
the "other insurance" clause is to prohibit receipt of 
duplicative benefits. Since Mrs. Crowther's medical expenses 
were in excess of $4,000 she would not be receiving duplicative 
benefits were she to be paid $2,000 in PIP medical benefits from 
each of two different insurance carriers. 
The Insurance Commissioner's Regulation 73-1, Article 
5, Subdivision i, which seeks to set a "maximum amount of minimum 
PIP benefits an injured person may receive pursuant to 
involvement in a motor vehicle accident" and mandates that "there 
shall be no stacking or duplication of such benefits"/ conflicts 
with the plain language of U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2), and is therefore 
in excess of the administrative authority granted him. 
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Finally/ if Mrs. Crowther is entitled to receive PIP 
medical expense benefits from her own insurer, she is also 
entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to U.C.A. § 
31-41-8. 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT IMPLICITLY 
PROVIDED FOR EXCESS PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
BENEFITS COVERAGE, AS LONG AS THE INSURED DOES 
NOT RECEIVE DUPLICATION OF BENEFITS 
The issue to be resolved is whether appellant Vickie 
Crowther, who has been paid $2/000 PIP medical expense benefits 
by the insurer of the driver who struck her, is entitled to 
collect an additional $2,000 from her own insurer in view of the 
fact that her medical expenses are well in excess of $4,000. The 
case requires interpretation of the Utah Automobile No-Fault 
2 
Insurance Act and a determination as to whether any exclusion or 
other coverage-limiting provision of Nationwide's policy validly 
permits Nationwide to deny coverage to Mrs. Crowther. As is 
discussed later in this brief, Nationwide's policy does contain 
an unambiguous exclusion which, if valid, clearly bars Mrs. 
Crowtherfs claim. She submits that the exclusion is not 
permitted by the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
2. The Act, as such, was repealed along with the rest of Title 
31 when Title 31A was enacted and became effective on July 1, 
1986. Appellantfs accident occurred on January 25, 1986 and this 
Court's opinion should, therefore, be based on the prior law. 
Appellant doubts that reference to the new no-fault statutory 
scheme, U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 et seq., would change the result. 
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Utah's statutory no-fault scheme neither expressly 
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permits nor prohibits so-called "stacking" of benefits. 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7(2) stated: 
"When a person injured is also an insured party under 
any other policy/ including those complying with this act/ 
primary coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring 
the motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident 
arose." 
Use of the word "primary" in the statute infers the 
possible existance of "excess" coverage. If the legislature had 
not intended that an injured person be allowed to make a claim 
under more than one policy/ it would not have used the word 
"primary". The statute would then read/ "When a person injured 
is also an insured party under any other policy/ including those 
complying with this act/ [] coverage shall be afforded by the 
policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of which the 
accident arose." By using the word "primary"/ the legislature 
provided for priority of payment: primary coverage is to be 
afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use 
of which the accident arose, and excess coverage is to be 
afforded by "any other policy/ including those complying with 
this act". 
3. Appellant uses the term "stacking" in a broad sense. She 
really seeks to hold Nationwide liable for excess coverage/ 
primary coverage having been exhausted before she had been 
totally indemnified for her medical expenses. 
4. U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(4) contains almost identical language. 
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Reference to the new Insurance Code, Title 31A, 
provides further evidence of the legislature's intent to allow an 
insured to "stack" personal injury protection benefits/ as long 
as to do so does not result in receipt of duplicative benefits. 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-305(6) provides that "In no event shall the limit 
of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more 
motor vehicles be added together, combined, or stacked to 
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident. . . . " However, that portion of 
Title 31A which discusses "personal injury protection" coverage, 
U.C.A. §§ 31A-22-306 et seq., contains no similar prohibition 
against combining or stacking personal injury protection 
benefits. Instead, new section 3lA-22-309(4), in almost 
identical language to that of section 31-41-7(2), provides for 
the same priority of payment that existed at the time Mrs. 
Crowther sustained injuries and incurred medical expenses. 
In view of the fact that no other state with a 
statutory no-fault scheme has precisely the same scheme as was 
contained in the Utah Automobile No-Pault Insurance Act, 
reference to analagous cases in other jurisdictions has only 
limited value. Nevertheless, in every other no-fault 
jurisdiction which has considered whether an insured may combine 
coverage where two or more policies are issued by different 
insurers, the courts have held that the insured may avail him or 
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herself of excess coverage. See, e.g. Wasche v. Milbank Hut. 
Ins. Co./ Minn., 268 N.W.2d 913 (1978); Esler v. United Services 
Auto. Assoc./ S.C., 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979); Porter v. Utah Home 
Fire Ins. Co./ Or., 650 P.2d 130 (1982); and National General 
Ins. Co. v. Meeks, Ga., 244 S.E.2d 920 (1978). In Baron v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ga., 276 S.E.2d 78 (1981), the injured 
person was a passenger in an insured motor vehicle. Her medical 
bills were less than the PIP benefits available under the 
driver!s policy so the Georgia court held that to also allow a 
claim under her own auto policy would result in an undeserved 
duplication of benefits. The court did state, however: 
"Under our analysis, had the Barons1 claim for 
necessary medical expenses arising from the collision 
exceeded the $2,500 limit on that coverage available to them 
under the [driver's] policy . . . the PIP "no fault" 
provisions of their own policy would have been triggered and 
they would have been afforded coverage thereunder for the 
excess PIP claims up to the limits thereof." 
Nevada's no-fault plan is generally similar to the Utah 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act and neither expressly permits 
nor prohibits "stacking" of benefits. Nevertheless, in Travelers 
Ins. Co. v. Lopez, Nev., 567 P.2d 471 (1977), the Nevada Supreme 
Court held that "stacking" was permissable. In that case, Lopez 
was injured when his automobile collided with that of an 
5. The no-fault schemes in some states contain a limiting 
statute. One such statute—that contained in the North Dakota 
statutory scheme—states: "The maximum amount of basic no-fault 
benefits payable . . . resulting from accidental bodily injury to 
any one person as the result of any one accident shall not exceed 
fifteen thousand dollars . . .." (§26-41-03(2), NDCC). The Utah 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act contained no such limiting 
statute. 
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uninsured motorist. His automobile was covered under two 
separate policies/ each containing no-fault coverage. The 
court's opinion permitted Lopez to recover benefits under both 
policies. The court found an important public policy 
consideration to support its conclusion. The court pointed out 
that Lopez paid premiums on both policies covering the same 
vehicle and the insurance company "accepted the payment of 
premiums and has/ in effect/ assumed the risk that injury to the 
insured may occur." (567 P.2d at 473). 
The same public policy consideration exists in the 
instant case. Vickie Crowther paid premiums to Nationwide for/ 
among other things/ no-fault coverage. She was entitled to 
coverage to the full extent permitted by the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act/ and limited only as permitted by the Act* 
Nationwidefs insistence that she must look only to the insurer of 
the vehicle which struck her frustrates that policy. 
In each case where a court has prohibited "stacking" of 
no-fault benefits the decision was grounded on one of three 
factual or statutory basis not present in the instant case. 
Either (1) an insured tried to make a claim on multiple vehicles 
insured under one policy or by a single insurer/ or (2) 
"stacking" would have resulted in a recovery in excess of actual 
medical bills or in excess of the amount prescribed by a 
"limiting" statute [see fn. 5]/ or (3) the statutory scheme 
expressly prohibited "stacking". None of those basis exist for 
denial of coverage in the instant case. Payment by defendant 
Nationwide of its PIP medical benefits policy limits will not 
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result in a windfall to its insured because her medical bills 
exceed the combined limits of the policy covering the automobile 
which struck her and the policy issued by defendant. 
B. 
THE POLICY EXCLUSION RELIED UPON BY NATIONWIDE IS NOT 
ONE OF THOSE EXCLUSIONS PERMITTED BY THE UTAH 
AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT 
Endorsement 1594 to the policy issued by Nationwide/ 
entitled "personal injury protection (Utah)" (R. 59), provides 
that Nationwide "will pay benefits for accidental bodily injury 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor 
vehicle. It pays regardless of fault in the accident. Benefits 
include Medical Expenses . . . . You and your relatives are 
covered for bodily injury caused by accident involving the use of 
any motor vehicle." 
Endorsement 1594 also provides, under the heading 
"Coverage Exclusions", "We will not pay for bodily injury to 
anyone arising from any of the following: . . . e. Occupying or 
being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle other than your 
auto, which is covered as required under the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act." The exclusion addresses the factual 
situation in which plaintiff was involved. She was "hit as a 
pedestrian" by a motor vehicle which was "covered as required" 
under the Act. However, the policy purports to create an 
exclusion from PIP coverage which is not permitted by the Act. 
Provided an injured person fits within one of the three 
categories of persons covered by the Act (U.C.A. § 31-41-7(1)), 
the only exclusions from coverage permitted by the Act are those 
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set forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 
Utah, 608 P.2d 242 (1980). None of those exclusions (which are 
all also included in Endorsement 1594) are applicable in the 
instant case. Vickie Crowther was a person described in U.C.A. § 
31-41-7(1)(a)—she was injured in an accident in this state 
involving any motor vehicle—and thus is entitled to coverage 
from her insurer, subject only to the permissable exclusions set 
forth in U.C.A. § 31-41-10. In the Osuala case, supra, this 
court did not explicitly hold that the exclusions set forth in 
Section 31-41-10 were the only permissable exclusions to no-fault 
coverage. This court did not need to make that finding because 
it determined that Osuala, an uninsured motorist, was not one of 
those persons described in section 31-41-7(1). When it enacted 
Title 31A the legislature, presumably familiar with Osuala, 
resolved any doubt. The old section § 31-41-10 began, "Any 
insurer may exclude benefits: . . ." U.C.A. § 3lA-22-309(2)(a), 
covering the same subject matter, begins with the language: "Any 
insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
6. U.C.A. § 31-41-10 provides, 
"Any insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a)(i) For injury sustained by the injured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not 
insured under the policy, or 
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while 
operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or 
implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession 
of the insured motor vehicle. 
(b) To any injured person, if such person's conduct 
contributed to his injury under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally? or 
(ii) While committing a felony." 
15 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits:" and then 
lists the same permissable exclusions as were set forth in 
Section 31-41-10. Under the new Insurance Code, as under the old 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, the exclusion for 
pedestrian insureds is not one permitted by the statutory scheme. 
C. 
THE NATIONWIDE POLICY "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE 
IS NOTHING MORE THAN ANOTHER EXCLUSION NOT 
PERMITTED BY THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT 
INSURANCE ACT 
Nationwide also contends that its "Other Insurance" 
clause, as contained in Endorsement 1594, bars Vickie Crowtherfs 
claim for additional PIP medical expense benefits. That clause 
(R. 61) states, 
OTHER INSURANCE No insured may receive duplicate benefits 
under this and any similar insurance. 
Similar insurance may apply to an accident involving bodily 
injury to you or a relative/ or bodily injury to someone 
else involving the use of your auto. If it does, all 
benefits payable cannot exceed the highest available under 
any one policy. We will pay our proportional share of such 
benefits. That share will be our proportion of the total 
benefits available." 
All bold print in the quoted portion of the Other 
Insurance clause is also in bold print on the policy. The first 
paragraph of the Other Insurance clause provides only that no 
insured may receive duplicate benefits. In view of the 
stipulated fact that Vickie Crowther has received $2,000 in 
benefits and her medical bills exceed $4,000, it is clear that 
plaintiff is not going to receive duplicate benefits should she 
receive payment from her own insurer, Nationwide. 
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Apart from the prohibition against duplicate benefits/ 
it is clear that the Other Insurance Clause is nothing more than 
an additional exclusion from coverage. As was the case with the 
exclusion from coverage for pedestrian insureds who are injured 
by an insured driver, the exclusion from coverage for an insured 
who has received benefits from another source is not one of those 
exclusions permitted by U.C.A. § 31-41-10. 
The intent of the legislature that an insurer who 
provides personal injury protection coverage should not be 
allowed to exclude coverage by way of an "other insurance" clause 
can be discovered by looking to the new Insurance Act, Title 31A. 
U.C.A. § 3lA-22-302(1) provides that every motor vehicle 
insurance policy shall contain liability coverage (31A-22-302(1) 
(a)) and uninsured motorist coverage (31A-22-302(1)(b)). U.C.A. 
§ 3lA-22-302(2) provides that "except for motorcycles" every 
motor vehicle insurance policy shall contain personal injury 
protection coverage. U.C.A. § 3lA-22-303(2)(a) provides that a 
policy of liability coverage may "provide for the prorating of 
the insurance under that policy with other valid and collectible 
insurance." However, there is no similar statutory permission 
granted to insurers to provide for prorating of personal injury 
protection coverage. 
The natural inference is that the legislature meant 
what it said in Section 31A-22-309, headed "Limitations, 
exclusions and conditions to personal injury protection": the 
only permissable limitations to coverage are those set forth in 
that statute. As previously discussed, there is no provision in 
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section 31A-22-309, or old section 31-41-10/ for an insurer to 
limit its exposure to pay PIP beneifits by means of an "other 
insurance" clause. 
D. 
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S REGULATION 73-1, ARTICLE 5, 
SUBDIVISION i, CONFLICTS WITH U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2) 
AND IS IN EXCESS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AUTHORITY GRANTED HIM 
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act provided in 
part that the insurance "department is authorized to promulgate 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the purposes 
of this act". U.C.A. § 31-41-12. Pursuant to that authorization 
the insurance commissioner promulgated Regulation 73-1/ Article 
5, subd. if which states: 
"It is the intent of the Act to provide a package of 
minimum Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits to each 
person injured in a motor vehicle accident occurring in 
Utah. The minimum PIP benefits are to be provided by the 
insurer of the motor vehicle which the person was occupying 
at the time of the accident or by which he was struck as a 
pedestrian. The maximum amount of minimum PIP benefits an 
injured person may receive pursuant to involvement in a 
motor vehicle accident shall be those amounts specified 
under Section 31-41-6. There shall be no stacking or 
duplication of such benefits." 
Appellant submits that the Insurance Commissioner's 
prohibition against stacking of PIP benefits was in excess of his 
authority and a misconstruction of legislative intent. The 
legislature's specific prohibition against stacking of uninsured 
motorist coverages (U.C.A. § 3lA-22-305(6))/ while reinacting the 
language of section 31-41-7 at U.C.A. § 3lA-22-309(4), provides 
strong support for appellant's claim. 
It is well settled that the legislature may not 
delegate authority to a regulatory agency to adopt rules or 
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regulations which abridge or modify statutorily created rights. 
IML Freight/ Inc. v. Ottosen/ Utah, 538 P.2d 296 (1975). The 
quoted portion of Regulation 73-1 purports to create an exclusion 
from, or limitation to, PIP coverage which is not permitted by 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act which, as discussed 
above, specifically listed permissable exclusions. Regulation 
73-1 conflicts with U.C.A. § 31-41-7(2) which implicitly 
contemplates the existance of "excess" coverage by mandating that 
"primary coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring the 
motor vehicle out of the use of which the accident arose." 
There is nothing in the No-Fault Act itself which sets 
forth "maximum amount of minimum PIP benefits". If the 
Commissioner's regulation were taken at face value it would be 
illegal for an insured to bargain for and pay a higher premium 
for coverage greater than the minimum coverage which auto * 
insurers must offer. 
Colorado's no-fault scheme, the "Colorado Auto Accident 
Reparations Act" (CRS §§ 10-4-701 et seq.), also provides that 
the director may make rules and regulations necessary for the 
administration of the Act. However, in Travelers Indem. Co. v. 
Barnes, Colo., 552 P.2d 300 (1976), the Colorado Supreme Court 
held as follows: 
"Construction of a statute by administrative officials 
charged with its enforcement shall be given great deference 
by the courts, [citation]. However, administrative 
regulations are not absolute rules. They may not conflict 
with the design of an Act, and when they do the court has a 
duty to invalidate them, [citation]. Furthermore, when an 
administrative official misconstrues a statute and issues a 
regulation beyond the scope of a statute, it is in excess of 
administrative authority granted." (552 P.2d at 303) 
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Regulation 73-1/ Article 5/ Subd. i/ is just such a 
case of misconstruction of the no-fault scheme which/ if 
enforced, would result in an abridgment of the rights of premium 
paying insureds to receive all the PIP benefits permitted by the 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. Regulation 73-1 must be 
held invalid to the extent it purports to bar plaintiff's claim 
for coverage under her own policy. 
E. 
IF APPELLANT PREVAILS ON THIS APPEAL, SHE IS ABSOLUTELY 
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES. THE TRIAL COURTS 
ONLY DISCRETION IS AS TO AMOUNT 
U.C.A. § 31-41-8/ reenacted in substantially the same 
language at U.C.A. § 3lA-22-309(5)/ stated: 
"Payment of the benefits provided for in section 
31-41-6 shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are 
incurred. Benefits for any period are overdue if not paid 
within 35 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof 
of the fact and amount of expenses incurred . . . . In the 
event the insurer fails to pay such expenses when due . . . 
the person entitled to such benefits may bring an action in 
contract to recover these expenses plus the applicable 
interest. If the insurer is required by such action to pay 
any overdue benefits and interest/ the insurer shall also be 
required to pay reasonable attorney's fees to the 
claimaint." 
U.C.A. § 31-41-8 contemplated that if an insurer 
guesses wrong as to whether or not it owes PIP benefits to a 
claimant and refuses to pay/ the insurer, and not the claimant/ 
bears the risk of the wrong guess. If this court determines that 
the trial court erred and Vickie Crowther is entitled to benefits 
from Nationwide/ the only way she can recoup 100% of the benefits 
to which she was entitled is if she is also awarded her attorney 
fees. That Nationwide has defended Mrs. Crowther's action in 
good faith is no reason to require her to recover less than she 
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would have had Nationwide not "guessed wrong" as to the ultimate 
outcome of the action. 
If U.C.A. § 31-41-8 only came into play once an insurer 
was ordered by the court to pay benefits, an insurer could always 
refuse to pay benefits until ordered by the court to do so/ 
secure in the knowledge that there is no risk it might later be 
required to pay a greater sum than had it payed benefits when 
due. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Vickie Crowther is not trying to recover the 
same item of damage twice. Her medical bills are well in excess 
of the combined PIP medical expense limits of the two applicable 
policies. She does/ however/ wish to recover under each policy 
containing provision for payment of PIP medcial benefits until as 
many of the medical bills incurred are indemnified as policy 
limits will permit. In order to accomplish that goal/ Mrs. 
Crowther should be allowed to "stack" the maximum coverages for 
PIP medical benefits under each of the two applicable insurance 
policies to the extent of actual losses up to the combined policy 
limits of both policies. 
Based on all of the above/ appellant respectfully 
submits that the Order (summary judgment) entered by the District 
Court should be reversed and that summary judgment should be 
entered in her favor and against respondent Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company for $2/000 together with interest at \\% per 
month and reasonable attorney fees/ both as permitted by U.C.A. 
§ 31-41-8/ and costs of suit. 
Appellant further submits that the action should be 
remanded to the District Court for determination of the 
appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded to her. 
Dated: September / "I , 1986. 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT 
Attorney for Appellant 
Vickie D. Crowther 
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ADDENDUM 
SELECTED STATUTES FROM THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT 
INSURANCE ACT (REPEALED, JULY 1, 1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7. Personal injuries covered - Primary 
coverage - Reduction of benefits. 
(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be 
applicable to: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when 
injured in an accident in this state involving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile 
accidents occurring in this state sustained by any other natural 
person while occupying the described motor vehicle with the 
consent of the insured or while a pedestrian if injured in an 
accident involving the described motor vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any 
other policy, including those complying with this act, primary 
coverage shall be afforded by the policy insuring the motor 
vehicle out of the use of which the accident arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 
31-41-6 shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered in this 
act under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar 
statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive from the United States or any of its agencies 
because of his or her being on active duty in the military 
services. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-8. Payment of benefits - Time limit -
Action for overdue benefits and interest. 
Payment of the benefits provided for in section 31-41-6 
shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
Benefits for any period are overdue if not paid within 35 days 
after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and 
amount of expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable 
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the amount 
supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 35 
days after such proof is received by the insurer. Any part or 
all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 35 days after 
such proof is received by the insurer. In the event the insurer 
fails to pay such expenses when due, the amount of these expenses 
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shall bear interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month after the due 
date/ and the person entitled to such benefits may bring an 
action in contract to recover these expenses plus the applicable 
interest. If the insurer is required by such action to pay any 
overdue benefits and interest/ the insurer shall also be required 
to pay reasonable attorney's fees to the claimant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-10. Exclusions from coverage. 
Any insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a)(i) For injury sustained by the injured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not 
insured under the policy/ or 
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while 
operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or 
implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession 
of the insured motor vehicle. 
(b) To any injured person/ if such person's conduct 
contributed to his injury under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or 
(ii) While committing a felony. 
B. 
SELECTED STATUTES FROM THE INSURANCE CODE, 
TITLE 31A UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1986) 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302. Required components of motor 
vehicle insurance policies. 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies 
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security 
requirement of § 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under §§ 31A-22-303 
and 31A-22-304; and 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under § 31A-22-305/ 
unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4). 
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies/ 
purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security 
requirement of § 41-12a-301/ except for motorcycles/ shall also 
include personal injury protection under §§ 31A-22306 through 
31A-22-309. First party medical coverages may be offered or 
included in policies issued to motorcycle owners or operators. 
Motorcycle owners and operators are not covered by personal 
injury protection coverages in connection with injuries incurred 
while operating a motorcycle. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 3lA-22-303(1) through (2)(a). Motor vehicle 
liability coverage. 
(1) In addition to complying with the requirements of 
Chapter 21 and Part II of Chapter 22, a policy of motor vehicle 
liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1) (a) shall: 
(a) name the motor vehicle owner or operator in whose 
name the policy was purchased/ state that named insured's 
address/ the coverage afforded/ the premium charged/ the policy 
period/ and the limits of liability; 
(b) (i) if it is an owner's policy/ designate by 
appropriate reference all the motor vehicles on which coverage is 
granted/ insure the person named in the policy/ insure any other 
person using any named motor vehicle with the express or implied 
permission of the named insured/ and insure any person included 
in Subsection (l)(c) against loss from the liability imposed by 
law for damages arising out of the ownership/ maintenance/ or use 
of these motor vehicles within the United States and Canada/ 
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs/ for each motor 
vehicle/ in amounts not less than the minimum limits specified 
under § 31A-22-304; or 
(ii) if it is an operator's policy/ insure the person 
named as insured against loss from the liability imposed upon him 
by law for damages arising out of the insured's use of any motor 
vehicle not owned by him, within the same territorial limits and 
with the same limits of liability as in an owner's policy under 
Subsection (l)(b)(i); and 
(c) insure persons related to the named insured by blood/ 
marriage/ adoption/ or guardianship who are residents of the 
named insured's household/ including those who usually make their 
home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere/ to the 
same extent as the named insured. 
(2) A policy containing motor vehicle liability coverage 
under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a) may: 
(a) provide for the prorating of the insurance under that 
policy with other valid and collectible insurance; 
Otah Code Ann. § 3lA-22-305(6). Uninsured motorist coverage. 
(6) In no event shall the limit of liability for uninsured 
motorist coverage for two or more motor vehicles be added 
together, combined/ or stacked to determine the limit of 
insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one 
accident. If uninsured motorist coverage is available to an 
injured person under more than one insurance policy/ the injured 
person shall elect the policy under which he desires to collect 
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uninsured motorist benefits. Claimants are not barred against 
making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under 
previous elections. 
Utah Code Ann. § 3lA-22-309(1) through (5). Limitations, 
exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection. 
(1) No person who has direct benefit coverage under a policy 
which includes personal injury protection may maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries 
alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident, except 
where the person has sustained one or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection 
coverage under this part may only exclude from this coverage 
benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the injured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the insured and not 
insured under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while 
operating the insured motor vehicle without the express or 
implied consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession 
of the insured motor vehicle; or 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct 
contributed to his injury: 
(A) by intentionallly causing injury to himself; 
or 
(B) while committing a felony. 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the 
exclusions which may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under § 
31A-22-307 are reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is 
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered in this 
code under any workers1 compensation or similar statutory plan; 
and 
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(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled 
to receive from the United States or any of its agencies because 
he is on active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any 
other policy/ including those policies complying with this part/ 
primary coverage is given by the policy insuring the motor 
vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in § 31A-22-307 
shall be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 
30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact 
and amount of expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable 
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim/ the amount 
supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 
days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any part or 
all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after 
the proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer fails to 
pay the expenses when due/ these expenses shall bear interest at 
the rate of \\% per month after the due date. The person 
entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract to 
recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the 
insurer is requird by the action to pay any overdue benefits and 
interest/ the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable 
attorney's fee to the claimant. 
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RAYMOND M. BERRY 
JOHN R. LUND 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE D. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff, STIPULATED FACTS 
vs. 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE Civil No. C86-2548 
COMPANY, 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Steven H. 
Lybbert, and defendant, by and through its attorney, John R. 
Lund, stipulate to the following facts. In doing so, coun-
sel agree that other facts not stipulated to may be relevant 
to the issues raised in the pleadings. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Nationwide") is an insurer 
doing business in the State of Utah and with an office and 
place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. On January 25, 1986, plaintiff was the insured 
under a policy of automobile insurance issued by Nationwide. 
3. The automobile insurance policy issued by 
Nationwide included Endorsement 1594 providing for personal 
injury protection coverage. A true and correct copy of 
Endorsement 1594 is attached to these Stipulated Facts as 
Exhibit MAW. 
4. On January 25, 1986, plaintiff sustained acci-
dental bodily injury while a pedestrian when struck by a 
motor vehicle, other than her own, which was covered as re-
quired under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
5. As a direct and proximate result of the accident 
described in the preceding paragraph, plaintiff has incurred 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in a sum in excess 
of $4,000.00. 
6. Plaintiff has been paid $2,000.00 in personal 
injury protection medical expense benefits by the insurer of 
the motor vehicle which struck her. 
7. Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) is the entire 
amount of personal injury protection medical expense benefits 
available under the policy describing the automobile which 
struck plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff has made demand upon Nationwide for 
payment of $2,000.00 medical expense benefits pursuant to 
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the terms of the policy under which she was an insured. 
9. Nationwide has failed within thirty-five 
(35) days after receipt of proof of plaintiff's medical 
expensesf or at all/ to pay personal injury protection 
medical expense benefits under the policy issued by it. 
10. Plaintiff does not claim to be entitled to 
more than $2,000.00 in benefits under the policy issued by 
Nationwide. 
DATED this day of June, 1986. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED this day of June, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
John R. Lund 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Endorsement 1594 
Mm personal injury protection 
^
x
 (Utah) 
Please attach this important addition to your Century II policy. 
With i hi., endorsement your Century II auto policy is amended to provide Personal Injury Protection. Coverage is subject to all 
tenm and conditions oi your policy, except as changed by thib endorsement. 
SECTION I 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
Wt will pas benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. It pays 
regardless o( fault in the accident. Benefits include Medical Expenses. Work Loss, Funeral Expenses, and Survivors* Loss 
benelas. 
For purposes of this coverage: 
1. the wj.ds "you" and "your" mean the policyholder first named in n e attached Declarations. They do not include that 
policyholders spouse. 
2 the word "relative" means your spouse, any other person related to you by blood, marriage, and a ward or foster child. A 
relative may temporarily be living elsewhere. 
3 the wurdi "bodily injury" mean bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
4. the \^ ui.<> "motor vehicle" mcanany vehicle of a kind that must be rcg; ;ercd with the Divisionof Motor Vehicles of the Utah 
State Tax Commission under Title 41-1-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953 A motor vehicle docs not include a motorcycle. 
5. the word "insured" means a relative or anyone using your auto with jour permission. 
You and your relatives are covered for bodily injury caused by accident involving the use of any motor vehicle. 
Other pei^nis arc covered, provided your auto is not a motorcycle, a* I allows: 
I While occupying your auto with your consent or the permission of an insured. 
2. While occupying any motor vehicle other than your auto, if it is not used to carry persons for a fee. Such motor vehicle must 
be operated by you or a relative. Shared-expense car pools will not be considered carrying persons for a fee. 
V As a pedestrian if hit by your auto. Anyone occupying a motorcycle is not a pedestrian. 
We wiil pay benefits minus any deductible per person, per accident shown in your policy Declarations. Benefits are as follows: 
M Ki;IC A l. KXPENSES We will pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred. We will pay them up to $2000 per 
person, \)c^ accident. We will pay for the following: medical, surgical, x-i ay, ambulance, hospital, nursing, dental, prosthetic, 
and rehabilitation services and any recognized religious healing method. For hospital services, we will pay only up to the 
,emi-pnvaie room charge unless more intensive medical care is needed. 
(Continued on other kiOc; 
I<K l.vy.S.^  Wc Will pay I or i he covered pei*on's loss of income il ho ana hie to work because oft he bodily injury. We wtli 
isn uiuiiir; U.M beginning Ihicc days al'lci the ucadnii. .nuluu uj« i. nc 4..1 works al ia thai day If the insured is unable in 
k Ui. ..«*•:., .* LYSV) weeks alter the accident we will pay lor income L»s. regaining the day ailci the accident, and for up lit .V 
*s;.tie, iiiaiday. Ac will pay lor 859c' ol lost gros> income, not t.. v seed $150 pci week. We will only pay, howevei, l.». 
ii.e L;.* di.ruig the .overed person's lifciiinc. 
>»iii ai.-.o ^.», iwr-u'! \ices the covered person would have performed :•• his household, but tot the bodily injury. We will pa . 
o i l l '
 r.i di.>. Wc will pay for expenses incur icd beginning three d.i ^ alter the accident, and lor up to 365 days alter thai 
l! u.v lus.ncd is u.uble topciformsuch household^ >cn ices lor the ;. t U days alter tlie accident, we will pay beginning the 
aitci ii*e ace,dent, and lor up to the 365 days after that day. Wc u» • pay for expenses incurred only during the person^ 
imc. 
N^iiA;. KXi'ENSKS If the covered pcison dies from the bodily i;:;ary. we will pay for funeral and burial or cremation 
cn.scs incurred. We will pay up to $1,000. 
ii\'i\ \;U.W/ i.OSS it the covered pcison dies iioiu the buuii) injui we will p;fy $2,000 to his natural heirs. 
)V£fUGE EXCLUSIONS 
Wr •..•;:• iio: pay iot bodily injury to anyone arising from any of the following: 
a. The insured's intentional act. 
b. Committing a felony. 
c. (J,.ciaiing your auto without the consent of the insured or \\i.' not in lawful possession of it. 
d. Occupying a motor vehicle you own bui do not insure undei i: s endorsement. 
Occupying or being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle, uii r than your auto, which is covered as required under 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
f. Using a motor vehicle located as a residence or premises. 
g. Any act of war. 
h. Any hazard of nuclear material. 
Wc will nut pay for bodily injury to you or a relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by a relative and not insured as 
juircd under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
Wc will not pay for bodily injury to anyone entitled to benefits under Utah's Workmen's Compensation Law. 
ISUfcED PERSONS' DUTIES 
u ius-ic;. or someone for him will promptly report any accident tons ... writing. This report will identify injured persons. It 
il giw iiiioimaiion about the lime, place, and circumstance., ol the a. cident. 
ie iiuu* cu ui someone for him will promptly submit written prool oi v aim to us. This will be under oath if we require. 1 he 
ooi will.;! vc all necessary information for us to determine benefits and amounts payable. The insured will submit lo physical 
id menial examinations, by physicians we choose, whenever we reasonably request. 
the iiiiUicd, his legal representative, or his survivors bring an action against anyone for the bodily injury, a copy ol the 
unmoiis or complaint or other process served will be promptly for raided to us. 
IMiTS AND CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT 
itNKKiTS PAYABLE Insuring more than one person or vehicle ui: Icr your policy does not increase our liability to one 
erson in one accident. 
Vc will J educe any amount payable by any amount paid, payable, or i \ \ .iredas follows Under any workmen's compensation 
r similar plan except Utah's Workmen's Compensation Plan. By ihc United Slates or any of its agencies related to active 
jililarv duty. 
Similar insurance may apply to an accident invol ng bodily injury to you or a relative, or bodily injun to <.on>% ^nr S 
involving the use of your auto. II it docs, all benefit livable cannot exceed the highest available under any on*? poli'.-v u> •-•! 
pay our proportional share of such benefits That • hare will be our proportion of the total benefits available 
Similar insurance may apply to an accident that doc not involve you, a relative, or use of your auto. If it docs, we v ii! *yt\\ onh 
over and above what is available under the other \r mance. 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
I o the extent of any payment we make for a loss, w .ire entitled to any payment to the insured by anyone legal;/' .; !c fo: :h 
bodily injury. The insured will hold in trust for us hi ; ights ot recovery against any such party. He will do whi te *«- p- ^r,%r' 
secure such rights. He will do nothing to prejudice th ^ All related papers and instruments will be executed and dri'v-re.* ?,, ,;< 
SUBROGATION 
We have the right of subrogation. This means that Iter paying a loss, we will have the insured's right to sue for , •; v;.c:\t: 
recover the amount of our payment from anyone w ;.^ may be liable. The insured will do nothing to prejudice th?.* ">n* fh< 
insured will sign all papers and do whatever is nee•••-.••ary to transfer this right to us. 
ASSIGNABILITY 
No interest in your policv can be transferred wit hoi • our written consent However, if you die, this coverage will *. •. >n i<ve 
lor the rest of the policv period lor others who ue: entitled to coverage when you died. 
SECTION II 
PREMIUM RECOMPUTATION 
We have certain rights if there is a judicial finding that any provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fauit insurance hv i»;ri;;r, 
law suits are invalid. We will have the right to recompute the premium for any coverage under this policy. We will al>o h.r. e in 
right to void or amend the provisions of this endo; enient 
SECTION III 
OTHER COVERAGES 
We will pay benefits undci an M-:dical Payments •>' cragc provided "by this policy only over and above anv P-r-rna' Inj"' 
Protection benefits that are paid or payable t«*r b« ^ilvanjury under Uiis-or aay other policy^ This includes an\ he-uTtts tha 
would be payable except lor a deductible pnu.sio 
I he limits ot and an\ amount* payable under \ mni .1 Motor :SK coverage will be reduced by sums paid or n.i>ai* • imJci aiv 
Personal Injury Pioiectn'ii i o\t rage. I his unhide :••• benefit that ^ould have been paid or payable except {o« a HrductiM 
pro\ision. 
I his endorsement apphc* a> stated in the Declara r^ attached to jour policy 
I he endorsement is issued l>\ the Nationwide Mui .'. Insurance Compain ot Nationwide Mutual I'tre Insurant < ( orr.pnnv 
whichever has issued the pohc\ P> which it is atta< •«! 
NATIONWIDE */ JTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
NATIONWIDE MU UAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Columbus, Ohio 
Secretary President 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the Yj^k day of September, 1986, I 
hand delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Opening Brief to John R. Lund, Esq., Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
Steven $. Lybbert 
Attorney for Appellant 
Vickie D. Crowther 
